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Introduction

By way of introduction, it seems necessary to engage in a
defining of terms as they are used in the rather lengthy title of
this paper.

The term "Romantic" adhered to Kierkegaard is

precisely an attempt to show how Kierkegaard's paradigm of what
constitutes a "self" brings one to the same way of perceiving and
engaging reality as the Romantics: conscious imaginative
relation. 1

The phrase "Re-formation of the Appearances"

qualifies this relation.

What is implied here is not that

"objects" themselves change- ie: molecular structure- rather,
that the perceiver shifts one's central position of perception.
That is, one sees the same appearances differently. 2

The phrase,

"Via Existential Arrest" bespeaks the catalyst which is
responsible for this shift in perception.

More precisely, in

Romantics, as used here, refers primarily to a world view,
not specific authors and poets, that the Romantics adhered to in
opposition
to major
trends of
Cartesianism born
of the
Enlightenment. It is the world view that sees the perceiver as an
integral part of what is perceived - connected and participating in
the phenomena, as opposed to a disposition of subject/object split,
entertaining the positivistic modernist perspective of "absolute
objectivity." More on this later.
1

The terms "phenomena" and "appearances" are used
interchangeably in this paper. It is well to note, however, that
some schools of thought hold these to be different.
The main
difference is the view that phenomena per se involve that act of
perception, and is therefore more an activity. For instance, one
may ask if a rainbow exists without the perceiver; strictly
speaking, it is not a phenomenon if their is no perceiver.
In
essence, this is the topic being discussed in this paper - holding
that both appearances and phenomena entai 1, to one degree or
another, the activity of imaginative relation.
2

2

Kierkegaardian terms, the existential arrest is that actual event
of heightened consciousness of self, self-transcendence. 3

If the

existential arrest is the event that initiates a disposition
towards re-formation of the appearances, what is the actual means
to this event?

This is where the primary Kierkegaardian text for

this paper comes into play: The Concept of Anxiety.
For Kierkegaard anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the
reality of freedom brought on by one's consciousness of self as
both infinitude and finitude, possibility and necessity.

As

Reidar Thomte writes in the introduction to The Concept of
Anxiety:
Man stands at the juncture of nature and spirit; he is
involved both in freedom and necessity; he is both limited
and limitless. 'Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of
freedom and finiteness in which man is involved ... It is the
inevitable spiritual state of man, standing in the
paradoxical situation of freedom and finiteness.' Anxiety
is the permanent internal preconditioning of sin as well as
of creativity. (xvii) 4
Anxiety can lead one to become a self by becoming a synthesis, or
an active agent, that is in constant interplay between infinitude
and finitude.

This activity, this third element, is what

The term "event" is chosen carefully, for Kierkegaard views
the "moment" as a process itself. In fact, for Kierkegaard, within
the present moment eternity is to be found.
3

The present writer is sensitive to the gender exclusive
language used in this literature. Though the citations cannot be
altered, the writer will use inclusive language.
4

3

Kierkegaard calls "spirit."

It is, then, the synthesis of these

two elements that constitutes a "self."

"Man is a synthesis of

the psychical and the physical; however, a synthesis is
unthinkable if the two are not united in a third.

This third is

spirit" (Kierkegaard 43).
As a "self", anxiety will lead one to either a position of
faith, or a position of despair. 5

Notwithstanding, a position of

despair can be closer to a position of faith than a "non-self",
for the one in despair is conscious of it, and therefore a
"self."

However, due to the limited scope of this paper, the

focus will be primarily on the means to a position of faith, not
despair.
The last phrase of the title, "Towards Conscious Imaginative
Relation," bespeaks how the self can creatively engage the act of
perceiving and literally transform the appearances via
imagination.

Imagination awakens infinitude, infuses hope, and

transforms the appearances for the perceiver.

Being self is to

be empowered by the co-creativity of imagination to have a
powerfully transformative impact on the appearances.
Kierkegaard's paradigm cautions, however, that the self is still
partially constituted by necessity and finitude - by its limits.

For Kierkegaard, there are two kinds of despair - defiance
and weakness -, and both are the opposite of faith.
5

4

Since the self is a synthesis, it is not only spirit and
infinitude, and therefore one's necessity bears down on the self
with certain parameters.

For instance, although a paralyzed

child can actively engage the possibility of being a ballerina,
the child's necessity would not allow it.

Nonetheless,

Kierkegaard would argue that no one is without possibility, no
matter how dreadful the necessity of their self.

If one's

necessity is not used as an invincible barrier, rather, as a
challenge to growth, therefore, the way the appearances are
perceived and engaged is still fluid and subject to the
perceiver.

Northrop Frye writes, "the conscious subject is not

really perceiving until it recognizes itself as part of what it
perceives 11 ( 23). 6

For Frye, the world that we image is more real

than the one we stare at.

It is in this spirit that this

exploration is undertaken.
One other introductory qualifier: the main title,
Perception, 11 is stated thus vis
11

a

vis modernity.

11

Romantic

The impact that

the Enlightenment 11 has had on modern western civilization cannot

be over-estimated in this study - particularly in the sciences.
The deep trends of a Cartesian Subject-Object-split way of
perceiving the appearances - claiming to be immune to
In the extreme, one can make one's own life heaven or hell.
That is, since one is actually part of what one perceives, one can
inject positive or negative images,
and thus,
change the
appearances.
6

5

participation - has penetrated every area of human life in the
past three centuries; creating major shifts in epistemology and
the notion of "absolute objectivity" - most evident in
"positivism."

Lurking behind the crevasses of "absolute

objectivity" is the problem of idolatry.
not born of the Enlightenment.

Obviously, idolatry was

However, to consciously sever the

subject (self), though never entirely possible, from the
perceived "object" is to fixate the dynamism of the ever-changing
dialectic of subject-object relation - this is to engage in
idolatry consciously.

Post-Enlightenment idolatry pushes its

roots much deeper than pre-Enlightenment, for it is engaged
consciously. 7

Idolatry will be treated briefly in this paper.

However, unable to deal with these mammoth issues in this study,
let it suffice to say that this paper is advocating a postcritical reclaiming of conscious imaginative participation with
the phenomena.

Owen Barfield called this "Final Participation,"

yet others have named it "Second Naivete."

Whatever the label,

inherent behind all this is the acceptance that, as post-

It is well to note here that the Enlightenment -with this
subject-object split - has given birth to much wealth in human
history.
For instance, medicine.
The ability to treat the body
less mythically, and with more objectivity, had resulted in great
advances in medical treatment.
Capitalism, the Scientific and
Industrial revolution, etc. are also positive and unprecedented
advancements not unrelated to this new (Cartesian) way of
perceiving the phenomena. The point is, that though greater goods
have resulted, so too greater evils.
An idolatry with depths
unprecedented prior to the Enlightenment.
7
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enlightenment humanity, it is impossible to re-capture a preconscious romantic participation.

Therefore, the only way into a

participating relational mode of perception, in modern day, is
consciously. 8

Now to the deliberation at hand.

The focus of this paper is to attempt to analyze how, in
Kierkegaard's paradigm of what constitutes "a self", therepresentations of the phenomena change in the eyes of the
perceiver from a state of "no self" - lacking this consciousness
and active engagement of spirit-, to the moment of existential
arrest, to a state of being "a self" - new and ever-growing
consciousness as a result of this arrest.

The primary source

for this endeavour is Kierkegaard's text, The Concept of Anxiety.
Methodology for this endeavour will involve explication of the
text itself with nuances from other post-enlightenment literature
- ie: authors such as Dostoevsky, Kafka, and Camus.

Part one

will address a state of existence which Kierkegaard believes is a
state lacking "a self," focusing on the unconscious crisis of no

To understand the state of the post-modern, take the analogy
of a theatrical production.
Pre-modernity - pre-enlightenment was a disposition that could enjoy a theatrical production without
knowing all the mechanics used backstage. Modernity unveiled the
production, taking away the back curtain exposing all the
mechanical equipment, production crew, scaffolding, etc., working
behind the scene to create this pseudo-reality for the audience.
Finally, post-modernity is the ability to replace the back curtain,
aware of all the mechanics at play, and consciously re-enter the
romantic, second-naive perception that makes the reality of the
theatre a delight once again.
8
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self, and the resultant effect this has on one's imaging of the
world - a brief look at idolatry.

Part two will focus primarily

on that which ultimately brings on an existential arrest: anxiety
- the challenge of death, imminent and living.

Finally, part

three will deal with "self" established through active
consciousness, and how it enables one to re-form the appearances
via dialectical tension within the awesome creative power of responsibility and relation - the freedom to act upon, and to
suffer, the phenomena.

PART I
A State Lacking Conscious Relation: "No Self"
The biggest danger, that of losing self, can pass off in the
world as quietly as if it were nothing; every other loss, an
arm, a leg, five dollars, a wife, etc. is bound to be
noticed.
(Kierkegaard pp 62-63)
Does a person gain anything if he wins the whole world but
loses his life? (Mark 8:36)
Spren Kierkegaard, writing in his assumed pseudonym AntiClimacus in Sickness unto Death, believes that loss of self, or
not ever being a self at all, is the greatest danger within the
human condition.

From this viewpoint, in order to be a self one

must be conscious that one exists.

If, as Northrop Frye and the

Romantics claim, the world is imaged by the perceiver via

8

imagination, then, the perceiver must first exist consciously,
and, moreover, must engage their capacity to image and relate to
the world.

Consequently, this active relative consciousness

assumes and engages the capacity to relate.

In existential

thought, one might say there is no true life without knowing you
are alive, and actively engaging this consciousness. In this way,
the state of "no self" lacks the third element of what
constitutes a self: spirit (that which makes life more than
unconscious and finite existence).

"It [spiritlessness] worships

sometimes a dunce and sometimes a hero.
more than a charlatan.

But nothing impresses it

However, one fetish is soon replaced by

another" (Kierkegaard 199).

Kierkegaard qualifies his

description of this state:
The lostness of spiritlessness, as well as security,
consists in its understanding nothing spiritually and
comprehending nothing as a task, even if it is able to
fumble after everything with its limp clamminess.(95)

Most disturbing for Kierkegaard, however, is that for him
the state of spiritlessness, is a state without anxiety.

"In

spiritlessness there is no anxiety, because it is too happy, too
content, and too spiritless for that" (95). Lack of spirit, lack
of active consciousness, therefore, results in fixed images
(idolatry), loss of relation, and loss of self (or lack of self);
"it is the perfect idol worshipper" (95).

How, precisely, is

9

this idolatry?

A brief interjectory on idolatry may be

appropriate and helpful here.
"Idolatry begins in the substitution (usually unconscious,
but always at least partly so - for full consciousness of
idolatry ends it) of some experienced form of God's presence for
the presence itself" (Ridd 8).
This substitution means that the human component in the
experience comes to dominate the transcendent: the idolater
remembers the God he has known, not YHWH ("I will be who I
will be"). Emphasis is thrown on the human end of the
relation. The living God is lost in the deadened memory and may eventually degenerate into an 'ism' or a principle
or an entity. The advantage of an idol is that it can be
placed, controlled and appealed to by the egocentric self
(as the Biblical God cannot be). There is little wonder in
this, for it is, increasingly, the self objectified ...
Moreover, it looks like "the real thing": it bears the marks
of its origin in the biblical God, transcendent, free,
loving; yet without the draw-backs of uncertainty with
regard to Him, and judgment form Him upon the very idols in
which He is imaged. It gains in superficial plausibility
what it loses in fundamental reality. It makes for
believers who belong-again terribly-to themselves. 9 (Ridd 8)

Idolatry is not just something ancient.
The modern
Christian periodically (several times a day
habitually)
recognizes that the world as he is inclined to construe it is not
reality itself but a constellation of images ordered somewhat
egocentrically in the course of his well-meaning but inevitably
distorted stewardship.
He calls this distortion sin.
The
remembrance that "the earth is the LORD's" constitutes a critique
of his idolatry, a renewal of his capacity to let God be God, and
a refurbishing of the world in a new realism: he can let it alone,
now, in his mind - desist from having to dominate it. Mentally and
physically he can let it be as perhaps he would say) "itself";
though what he then perceives is never "itself" in a crude sense,
but a new image that arises out of his renewed relation with God
and therefore with all "things."
But the world is shining and
lovely and real when this happens (Ridd 6).
9
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Idolatry - fixed images - for Kierkegaard, then, is one of
the major problems with a state lacking "self" - a state lacking
active consciousness.

Fixed images not only effects one~

relationship with YHWH, but with all phenomena.

"The reason why

idolatry is dangerous is that ... we may collapse into the
preconscious state from which we have been trying to emerge"
(Frye 27).

When one is unaware of their creative and responsible

capacity to image the world, the world becomes fixed.

When one

abandons their creative relational powers, one abandons the world
to frozen objectification.

The flow of life between the

perceiver and the perceived ceases.

Idolatry is blindness in

the sense that one's way of seeing is fixed and all that is
perceived must conform to this assumed rigid lens, illusion.
In a similar way, loss of an engaged capacity to relate with
the phenomena is another major defect of a "no self."

The lure

of sleepy, complacent, and fixed images is very strong for it
requires no effort to relate.

Relation requires creative energy,

it requires spirit; a state of rejected relation does not.
Hence, a fixed, non-fluid perception is very comfortable and nonthreatening.

At times in history, for instance, this has been

the indictment to the Catholic Church, that through occasional
excessive mediatorship, she has undermined the individual~
capacity and desire to relate, as Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor,
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in The Brothers Karamazov, argues:
Behold what Thou didst further.
And all again in the name
of freedom! I tell Thee that man [sic] is tormented by no
greater anxiety than to find someone [church] quickly to
whom he can hand over that gift of freedom with which the
ill fated creature is born" (Dostoevsky 235).
The reformation protested that the Catholic Church had in certain
instances in its history - eg: indulgences - far too willingly,
and conveniently, taken away the responsibility of her members to
relate, and create, the world; a burden and freedom beyond the
masses, argues the Grand Inquisitor.

This is one of the

fundamental reasons for the ecclesiastical re-formation.

As John

S. Dunne, in A Search for God in Time and Memory, calls humankind
to a relation modelled by Christ, namely one with no mediator.
"Modern men [sic] have no mediators.

For the mediator himself

has no mediator- Christ's own relationship to God was an
unmediated one" (75).

"Who do you say I am" (Mark 8:29b).

The

mediation that is called for in relation to God is love and
faith, the Holy Spirit.

What is required is a consciousness of

the necessity of relation and a willingness to embrace the
responsibility of this relation.
"a self."

For Kierkegaard this requires

Does a "non-self", then, end in nothingness?

For Kierkegaard, not to be "a self" is the greatest of
tragedies, and even worse that it goes unnoticed.

Some writers,

like Franz Kafka, attempt to depict this great tragedy, as is

12
well exemplified in the character K., in Franz Kafka's The
Castle. This is the story of a man relentlessly embarked on a
futile pursuit to reach the castle, unsuccessful due to his lack
of consciousness of self, lack of authenticity.

That is, he was

too fragmented to reach that which he desired, wholeness; and was
unaware of it.

To K., "the castle hill was hidden, veiled in

mist and darkness" (Kafka 3).

Yet, "on the whole this distant

prospect of'the castle satisfied K.'s expectations [fragmented]"
(Kafka 11).

One might say that every time K. came closer to

experiencing an existential arrest (a heightened consciousness of
self), it threatened him, "as if to threaten him with the
fulfilment of his vague desire" (Kafka 21).

Similarly, as the

young rich man in Matthew's gospel was threatened by the
fulfilment of his vague desire: eternal life.
Jesus said to him, "If you want to be perfect, go and sell
all you have and give the money to the poor, and you will
have riches in heaven; then come and follow me." When the
young man heard this, he went away sad, because he was very
rich. (Matt 19:21-22)

In light of this, one may ask what it is, ultimately, that brings
on an existential arrest and thus enables one to become a "self"
and to experience the fulfilment of one's vague desires - to
transcend spiritlessness.

In other words, what is the catalyst,

for Kierkegaard, which brings on this arrest, and consequently, a

13
new consciousness?

Moreover, how does this existential arrest

transform the representations?

PART I I
A Catalyst to Existential Arrest: Anxiety of Death

"Even though there is no anxiety in spiritlessness, because
it is excluded as spirit, anxiety is nevertheless present, except
it is waiting" (Kierkegaard 96).

Here, Kierkegaard is speaking

from the perspective of~one with spirit.

As he qualifies,

"Viewed from the standpoint of spirit, anxiety is also present in
spiritlessness, but hidden and disguised" (96).

Nonetheless, it

is still necessary to experience anxiety to become a self.
Kierkegaard writes:
I will say that this is an adventure that every human being
must go through - to learn to be anxious in order that he
may not perish either by never having been in anxiety or by
succumbing in anxiety. (Kierkegaard 155)

If anxiety lies dormant in one who is spiritless, and is
necessary to become a self, the question become, "how can it be
awakened?"
One catalyst to existential arrest is death - experienced in
different manifestations:
When death appears in its true form as the lean and dismal

14
reaper, one does not look at it without terror; however,
when it appears disguised in order to mock the men who fancy
they can mock death, when the observer sees that the unknown
figure who captivates all by his courtesy and causes all to
exult in the wild gaiety of desires is death, then he is
seized by a profound terror.
(Kierkegaard 96)
The anxiety of the presence of death in the world manifests
itself in three pre-eminent existential experiences:

imminent

death, (the personal experience of knowing the actual moment
before death); the threat of death, (the experience of knowing
death is potentially very close, though not inevitable); living

death, (the personal experience of the total meaninglessness and
futility of existence).

As evident from Kierkegaard, and the

cross-section of literature cited below, it can be said that the
reality of death has possibly been the single most effective
catalyst to the awakening of anxiety,

engageme~t

of spirit,

dawning of consciousness, and, consequently the re-formation of
the appearances.

Anxiety of Imminent Death

Death remains as that which, itself unexplained, explains
that the whole of life was a game that came to an end,
... And so there is also a muteness of annihilation found in
the fact that the whole was merely a children's game, and
now the game is over. (Kierkegaard 93)
Not the real thing.

Everything you lived by and still live
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by is a lie, a deception that blinds you from the reality of
life and death ... the awareness of inevitable, imminent
destruction. (Tolstoy pp 128-129)

Depicting in dramatic form the same experience Kierkegaard
writes about above, Leo Tolstoy has Ivan Ilyich, in The Death of
Ivan Ilyich, struggle through the final moments of life - Ivan
comes to a new consciousness of the deception of his life.

The

final moments of life, as he knows it, force him to this
realization - an existential arrest.

Only after awakened anxiety

of the realization of the falsity of their lives, the lack of
authentic self, does a re-formation of the appearances begin.
"Yes, all of it was simply not the real thing.

But no matter.

can still make it the real thing- I can" (Tolstoy 132).

I

Just

before his death he realizes that what he feared so greatly was
not death, but life.

Consequently, because of this new

consciousness resulting from his existential arrest,

Ivan can

embrace life, and, thus, embrace a re-formed perception of death.
"And death? Where is it? ... Instead of death there was light.
'So that's it!' he exclaimed.

'What bliss!'" (Tolstoy 133).

Could this be the shift in perception that Luke depicts Jesus as
recognizing in the criminal hanging on the cross next to Jesus?
"Jesus said to the dying criminal,

'I promise you that today you

will be in Paradise with me'' (Luke 23:43).

16

Anxiety of the Threat of Death
And this is the moment of culmination, the moment when he is
greatest, not the moment when the sight of his piety is like
the festivity of a special holiday, but when by himself he
sinks before himself in the depth of sin-consciousness.
(Kierkegaard 110)
The anxiety of the sheer threat of literal death can also
bring a sudden heightened self-consciousness, the anxiety towards
existential arrest.

For example, in Albert Camus' The Plague,

several of the characters of the novel slowly realize that the
plague is among them.

It is this very threat of death that stirs

the people of Oran from their complacent sleep of habitual
"life", "a matter of lucidly recognizing what has to be
recognized" (Camus 37) . 10

As Kierkegaard would put it, "Anxiety

takes swift action, instantly plays the trump card of infinity,
of the category, and the individual cannot take the trick" (160).
The threat of physical death, however, leads to a much more
profound and frightening experience of anxiety towards
existential arrest, the moment of living death.

Anxiety of Living Death

In truth, the anxiety of death is also the anxiety of life
This will qualified in the following section.
10

itself.
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The moment signifies the present as that which has no past
and no future, and precisely in this lies the imperfection
of the sensuous life. The eternal also signifies the
present as that which has no past and no future, and this is
the perfection of the eternal. (Kierkegaard 87) 11

It is to the existential arrest of the eternal present that
Kierkegaard hopes anxiety will lead one. 12
way,

In a very similar

as Albert Camus writes in The Myth of Sisyphus, the most

profoundly acute, yet evasive, catalyst to the experience of
existential arrest is the anxiety of living death,

(the personal

experience of total meaninglessness and futility of eternal
existence).

"The absurd man [sic], when he contemplates his

torment, silences all the idols" (Camus 123). Camus claims, in
The Myth of Sisyphus, in order for this existential arrest to
occur and the appearances to be re-formed, "the mind must meet
the night" (65).

"There is no sun without shadow, and it is

For Kierkegaard "the present is the eternal, or rather, the
eternal is the present, and the present is full" ( 86).
"The
present, however, is not a concept of time, except precisely as
something
infinitely countless,
which again
is
infinitely
vanishing.
If this is not kept in mind, no matter how quickly it
may disappear, the present is posited, and being posited it again
appears in the categories: the past and the future" (Kierkegaard
86).
11

Kierkegaard recognizes, however, that this is not the
necessary end. He writes, "men are not willing to think eternity
earnestly but are anxious about it, and anxiety can contrive a
hundred evasions.
And this is precisely demonic"
(154).
Unfortunately, due to the parameters of this paper, these evasions
cannot be dealt with directly.
12

18
essential to know the night" (123).

Hence, it is in the moment

of knowing the night (despair), that one is thrust into a new
consciousness.

"Kierkegaard thinks despair offers the only

avenue to 'truth and deliverance'" (Hannay 5) . 13

That is, it is

the moment when one is experiencing both the human condition, and
the consciousness of self experiencing the human condition.

This

is to become an authentic self, and, consequently, it is this
disposition which emancipates one's capacity to
reform/transfigure the appearances.

Likely for this reason,

"Kierkegaard saw his own mission as a writer as that of assisting
his readers to the consciousness of their own despair" (Hannay
6).

"You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free"

(John 8:32).

Undergirding all this, however, remains the gnawing

question of exactly how the pain and "angst" of anxiety can
ultimately lead one to fullness of self, fullness of life.
Kierkegaard writes:
The relation, as always with the relation of anxiety, is
sympathetic and antipathetic. This in turn seems
paradoxical, yet such is not the case, because while anxiety
fears, it maintains a subtle communication with its object,
cannot look away from it, indeed will not, for if the
individual wills it, repentance is there. (103).

Kierkegaard sees despair as the opposite of faith.
Therefore, despair as it is used in this context, implies more the
culmination of anxiety before God, not the explicit rejection of
God.
13
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This, then, leads to the activity of being "a self," the action
of conscious imaginative relation.

Part I I I
To Be "a Self": Conscious Imaginative Relation

"Man [self] is a synthesis of psyche and body that is
constituted and sustained by spirit" (Kierkegaard 81).

The third

element, spirit, is the activity of interaction which was brought
on by anxiety, through existential arrest.

Thus, Kierkegaard

confidently posits:
That anxiety makes its appearance is the pivot upon which
everything turns. Man is a synthesis of the psychical and
physical; however, a synthesis is unthinkable if the two are
not united in a third. This third is spirit. (43)

However, what is meant by spirit?

Kierkegaard defines "spirit is

a friendly power, since it is precisely that which constitutes
relation" (44).

This given, however, does relation only entail

the interaction between the psychical and the physical?
Evidently not only in an isolated autonomous sense, for elsewhere
Kierkegaard writes, "At every moment, the individual is both
himself and the race.
state" (28).

This is man's perfection viewed as a

Going even further, on the last page of The Concept

of Anxiety, Kierkegaard writes on the transformative power of
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relation:
Because the significant actuality is after all not so
terrible as the possibility he himself had fashioned, and
which he used his strength to fashion, whereas he can now
use all his strength against actuality.
(162)

As a result of establishing an authentic self, this new
consciousness and perception, as well as the representations,·
engage their capacity to be creatively re-formed; as Sisyphus
could do, only in the whole knowledge of his wretched condition:
Sisyphus ... knows the whole extent of his wretched
condition. It is what he thinks of during his descent
If the descent is thus sometimes performed in sorrow, it can
also take place in joy. (Camus 121)

This is the emancipating freedom of response-ability and
relation.

Within responsibility is the freedom of choice.

eyes will be opened

"Your

knowing good and evil" (Genesis 3:5).

Hence, knowing good and evil, one can, and must, choose one or
the other.

Like the Older Testament writer scribes, "I am

offering you life or death, blessing or curse. Choose life"
(Deut.31:19). The ability to respond consciously enables one to
establish that whose loss Kierkegaard so greatly feared: the
self.

"Selfhood is constituted in consciousness; it is itself,

if you like, a degree of consciousness" (Hannay 7).

Thus, when

one is conscious that they can be a responding member of the
dialogue with the phenomena they perceive, they are free to
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systematically engage their imagination creatively.
Barfield, in

Owen

Saving the Appearances, describes it as the ability

"to experience the representations as idols, and then to be able
to perform an act of figuration consciously" (147).
Notwithstanding, there is a great onus in recognizing the
responsibility of relation.

Northrop Frye proposes that the

conscious subject is not really perceiving until it recognizes
itself as part of what it perceives (23).

In this sense, then,

everyone is responsible for everyone, for within everyone is part
of oneself.

As Paul writes to the Corinthians, "all of us,

though many, are one body" (10:17).

That is, the freedom of

relation which enables one to respond as co-creator of the
representations also requires one to suffer the representations
in order to maintain the dialectical tension that relation, by
its very nature, requires.

This is, in essence, a suffering

relation - putting love and building up of community above one~
personal desires and freedoms - as Paul so urgently calls for in
Romans chapters 14-15. 14

Indeed, even scripture must be read

within this dialectical relation, as Luke T. Johnson writes in
the very last sentence of The Writings of the New Testament,
"living conversation with all the writings in all their diversity

14 There are places in Pauline and deutero-Pauline writings
that summon this type of behaviour.
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and divergence ... Only so can they continue to speak" (548).
Relation entails the paradox of the freedom to suffer.
Freedom to suffer may seem like an oxymoron, however, it simply
implies that, in order for an authentic creative relationship to
exist, both "subject" and "object" must act and suffer one
another. 15

Owen Barfield described this type of vulnerability as

"an extra-sensory link between the percipient and the
representation 11 (34).

This vulnerability, as evident in the

Romantics 1 can run many risks, Kierkegaard maintains:

"He who

has not suffered under human bestiality will not become spirit"
(Hannay 7).

It seems quite possible that this open vulnerability

to relation is what inspired Luke to have Jesus utter from the
cross,

"Father 1 forgive them, for they do not know what they are

doing" (Luke 23:34).
From the foregoing, it seems quite apparent that anxiety
induced existential arrest has a definite impact on the reformation of the appearances.

One may even conclude that without

anxiety towards this arrest, the images, to the unconscious

This is, by no means, an attempt to justify or glorify the
presence of suffering in the world, particularly that of the
innocent. Suffering in the world remains a great theological issue
of relentless debate - particularly in the concerns of Liberation
Theology.
To suffer, as it is implied here, is to be vulnerably
open to relation.
It is to have the willingness to allot another
the same creative freedom to image the world. Freedom can only be
realized in relation. Tragically, this awesome freedom has been so
terribly abused throughout history, as it continues to be abused in
modern day.
15
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percipient, are bound to remain fixed (idolatry).
Notwithstanding, within this new consciousness of one's extended,
responsive, and relative presence in the phenomena - an authentic
self -, one is ultimately brought to a re-formation of the
appearances which engages the potential to move even beyond
"Barfield's rainbow," which Fyodor Dostoevsky, in The Brothers
Karamazov, so sagaciously captures in Mitya's exclamation from
prison:
Yes, life is full, there is even life underground ... You
wouldn't believe, Alexey, how I want to live now, what a
thirst for existence and consciousness has sprung up in me
within these peeling walls ... And what is suffering? I am not
afraid of it ... ! exist. In thousands of agonies- I exist.
I'm tormented on the rack- but I exist! Though I sit alone
on a post - I exist! I see the sun, and if I don't see the
sun, I know it's there. And there's a whole life in that,
in knowing that the sun is there (pp.560-561).

This is Romantic Perception, to actively engage the creative
transformation of the appearanceS. 16

For the post-modern,

romantic perception can only be re-claimed consciously - that is,
to enter a second-naivete.

Similarly, for Kierkegaard, when an

This is very similar to how Karl Rahner understands "self
as Subject", and God's presence in the world. In our "fundamental
option," - the capacity to orient ourselves through the radical
nature of freedom (irrevocable actions) - we have the co-creative
capacity to make ourselves.
In the dimension of faith, romantic
perception is another way of describing the capacity to see God in
all the appearances - not to see God as simply another category,
rather a mode, a way of perception that opens one to an entirely
new dimension.
16
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authentic self has been established - through anxiety, through
existential arrest, to conscious imaginative relation - one has
shifted in locus of perception of the appearances.
either despair or faith. 17
extricated.

This leads to

In the latter, however, anxiety is

"As soon as the actuality of freedom and of spirit

is posited, anxiety is cancelled" (Kierkegaard 96).

Thus, on the

romantic perception of a stance of faith, Kierkegaard then
writes:
[Faith gives] courage to renounce anxiety without anxiety,
which only faith can do; faith does not thereby annihilate
anxiety, but, itself eternally young, it extricates itself
from anxiety's moment of death. Only faith is able to do
this, for only in faith is the synthesis eternal and at
every moment possible. (117)

17 Again, in Kierkegaard's Christian anthropology, he sees the
individual without spirit in active relation with God as an
inauthentic self.
As Reidar Thomte writes on Kierkegaard, "The
God-relation is an ontological quality of the self, apart from
which the self cannot fully actualize or know itself as the
infinite self" (xvii).
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